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                                                        PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
   
No. 15-1779 
____________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
         
v. 
  
HECTOR RENGIFO,  
              Appellant 
 
       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
(D. C. Criminal No. 1-13-cr-00131-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo                       
       
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 on February 12, 2016 
 
Before:  FUENTES, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 5, 2016) 
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O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 In this appeal of the sentence imposed by the District 
Court, we must determine the definition of “term of 
imprisonment” in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Section 
4A1.2(k).  Hector Rengifo challenges the District Court’s 
interpretation of “term of imprisonment” as synonymous with 
“sentence of imprisonment.”  Under the District Court’s 
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interpretation, the career offender provisions of the 
Guidelines applied to Rengifo and he received an increased 
sentence.  We conclude that the terms are synonymous.  We 
will, therefore, affirm the judgment of sentence of the District 
Court.   
 
I. 
 In 2014, Rengifo pled guilty to “distribution and 
possession with intent to distribute heroin” in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  Under the Guidelines, the offense carried 
a sentencing range, adjusted for Rengifo’s acceptance of 
responsibility, of 15 to 21 months.  Because Rengifo had two 
prior controlled substance convictions in state court from 
1999 and 2007, the government argued for the application of 
the career offender provisions of the Guidelines, which would 
lead to the addition of criminal history points and increase 
Rengifo’s sentencing range to 151 to 188 months.  The 
District Court agreed with the government but granted a 
downward variance and sentenced Rengifo to 120 months of 
imprisonment.   
 
 A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant 
was at least eighteen years old at the time he or she 
committed the instant offense of conviction, (2) the instant 
offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the 
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a 
crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.1  Rengifo 
does not dispute that his 2007 conviction for conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine qualifies as a prior felony conviction.  He 
                                              
1 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). 
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does, however, argue against counting his 1999 conviction for 
possession with intent to distribute marijuana as a prior felony 
conviction.   
 
 As relevant here, for the purpose of computing an 
offender’s criminal history, prior sentences of imprisonment 
are counted as follows:  (1) “[a]ny prior sentence of 
imprisonment exceeding one year and one month that was 
imposed within fifteen years of the defendant’s 
commencement of the instant offense is counted”; (2) “any 
prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one 
month, whenever imposed, that resulted in the defendant 
being incarcerated during any part of such fifteen year 
period” is counted; and (3) “[a]ny other prior sentence that 
was imposed within ten years of the defendant’s 
commencement of the instant offense is counted.”2  Given 
that Rengifo’s 1999 conviction was more than ten years old 
and fewer than fifteen years old at the time of Rengifo’s 
instant offense, it is counted as a prior felony conviction if 
Rengifo’s sentence of imprisonment for the 1999 conviction 
exceeded one year and one month.     
 
 For the 1999 conviction, a Pennsylvania court initially 
sentenced Rengifo to “time served to 12 months.”  Rengifo 
served 71 days and was paroled.  His parole was revoked and 
he was sentenced to the remaining 294 days of the original 
sentence.  He served another 120 days, was paroled, and 
again his parole was revoked.  He then was sentenced to the 
remaining 174 days of his sentence.  For calculating the 
length of the sentence of imprisonment, these revocations 
triggered § 4A1.2(k) of the Guidelines, which provides that 
                                              
2 Id. §§ 4A1.2(e)(1), (e)(2). 
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“[i]n the case of a prior revocation of probation, parole, 
supervised release, special parole, or mandatory release, add 
the original term of imprisonment to any term of 
imprisonment imposed upon revocation.” 3   The parties 
disagree on the interpretation of “term of imprisonment,” a 
term that is not defined in the Guidelines.   
 
 Rengifo argues that his term of imprisonment for the 
1999 conviction is 365 days:  71 days served prior to any 
parole and 294 days served after his revocations.  Under 
Rengifo’s interpretation, his 365-day sentence is not a prior 
felony conviction under the career offender provisions and 
Rengifo should not be subject to the enhancement.  The 
government maintains that the term of imprisonment for the 
1999 conviction is 659 days, consisting of the initial 365-day 
maximum sentence imposed plus the 294 days sentenced for 
the parole violations.  Under the government’s interpretation, 
Rengifo’s term of imprisonment is greater than one year and 
one month, and thus the career offender guidelines were 
properly applied to him.   
  
II.4  
 Although we have not had occasion to consider the 
definition of “term of imprisonment” in § 4A1.2(k), which 
directs courts in calculating a prior sentence for the purpose 
                                              
3 Id. § 4A1.2(k)(1) (emphasis added). 
4 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a).  Our review of the District Court’s interpretation of 
the Sentencing Guidelines and constitutional questions is 
plenary.  United States v. McKoy, 452 F.3d 234, 236 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
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of applying the criminal history enhancement to “add the 
original term of imprisonment to any term of imprisonment 
imposed upon revocation[,]” the Guidelines provide textual 
clues as to the term’s meaning.  Application Note 11, which 
informs the interpretation of § 4A1.2(k), instructs, “[r]ather 
than count the original sentence and the resentence after 
revocation as separate sentences, the sentence given upon 
revocation should be added to the original sentence of 
imprisonment, if any, and the total should be counted as if it 
were one sentence.”5  The Note’s reference to “original 
sentence of imprisonment” is a strong indication that 
“sentence of imprisonment” and “term of imprisonment,” the 
latter of which is used in § 4A1.2(k), are interchangeable.6  
Also indicative is the fact that these terms are found in close 
proximity throughout the career offender guidelines and in 
notes accompanying the section.7   
 
 Rengifo argues that the terms are not interchangeable 
for three reasons.  First, Rengifo invokes the statutory 
construction canon that “where sections of a statute do not 
include a specific term used elsewhere in the statute, the 
drafters did not wish [the not-included term] to apply.”8  
According to Rengifo, the use of “term of imprisonment” 
rather than “sentence of imprisonment” in § 4A1.2(k) means 
that “sentence of imprisonment” does not apply.  However, 
                                              
5 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 n.11 (emphasis added). 
6 United States v. Ramirez-Perez, 643 F.3d 173, 177 (6th Cir. 
2011); United States v. Jasso, 587 F.3d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
7 Jasso, 587 F.3d at 711.  
8 Alaka v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 456 F.3d 88, 98 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).  
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this interpretation would render irrelevant Application Note 
11 and violate the general rule that courts interpret 
Application Notes to the Guidelines so that no words shall be 
discarded as meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.9   
 
 Second, Rengifo argues that the interpretation of the 
terms as synonymous violates due process for two reasons:  
first, it leads to double counting of his sentence, and second, 
it would not provide adequate notice to defendants.  Neither 
argument is persuasive.  Regarding double counting, Rengifo 
essentially challenges the outcome where, although his 
original sentence imposed was “time served to 12 months,” 
his sentence of imprisonment was determined to be over one 
year and one month.  Section 4A1.2(k) “covers revocations of 
probation and other conditional sentences where the original 
term of imprisonment imposed, if any, did not exceed one 
year and one month.”10  Application Note 11 makes clear 
that, under § 4A1.2(k), “[i]f the sentence originally imposed, 
the sentence imposed upon revocation, or the total of both 
sentences exceeded one year and one month, the maximum 
                                              
9 Paek v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 793 F.3d 330, 337 
(3d Cir. 2015); see Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 
(1993) (“[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that 
interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it 
violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent 
with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”).  We 
note that although Rengifo raises several constitutional 
arguments, detailed below, he makes no arguments that 
would allow us to disregard the interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 
4A1.2(k) set forth in the Application Notes. 
10 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 n.11. 
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three points would be assigned.”11  Therefore, the Guidelines 
contemplate the scenario that Rengifo faces, and dictate the 
addition of criminal history points.  Moreover, Rengifo’s 
argument that his original sentence of imprisonment is 71 
days—the amount of time served prior to parole—as opposed 
to one year—the sentence pronounced—is based on an 
incorrect reading of the Guidelines, which state that sentence 
of imprisonment “refers to the maximum sentence 
imposed.”12  Application Note 2 further explains:  “the length 
of a sentence of imprisonment is the stated maximum” and 
“criminal history points are based on the sentence 
pronounced, not the length of time actually served.”13  
Therefore, the correct total of Rengifo’s sentence of 
imprisonment is 833 days, which consists of the maximum 
imposed original sentence of 365 days, plus the maximum 
imposed sentence for the first revocation of 294 days, and 
plus the maximum imposed sentence for the second 
revocation of 174 days.14  
 
 As for notice, due process does not require a defendant 
to be warned that his conviction might be used for 
enhancement purposes if he is later convicted of another 
crime.15  As the Supreme Court explained, a warning to the 
                                              
11 Id. 
12 Id. § 4A1.2(b)(1); United States v. Davis, 929 F.2d 930, 
932 (3d Cir. 1991). 
13 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 n.2.   
14 The sentence computed under § 4A1.2(k) is harsher than 
the position of the government on how the sentence should be 
computed.  However, we conclude that the clear language of 
§ 4A1.2(k) and the Application Notes requires this result.  
15 Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 (1994).  
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defendant that “if he is brought back into court on another 
criminal charge, [he] will be treated more harshly[,] would 
merely tell him what he must surely already know.”16 
 
 Finally, Rengifo urges us to apply the rule of lenity 
and reject the government’s interpretation.  This argument 
fails because the rule of lenity applies only if, “after seizing 
everything from which aid can be derived, we can make no 
more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”17  Because 
we conclude § 4A1.2(k) is unambiguous, the rule of lenity 
does not apply. 
 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of sentence of the District Court.  
                                              
16 Id. 
17 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995).  
